Cohocton Wind Watch
Cohocton Wind Watch is a community citizen organization dedicated to preserve the public safety, property values, economic viability, environmental integrity and quality of life in Cohocton, NY and in surrounding townships. Neighbors committed to public service in order to achieve a reasonable vision for a Finger Lakes region worthy of future generations.

READ about the FIRST WIND Connection to the Obama Administration

Industrial Wind and the Wall Street Cap and Trade Fraud


Thursday, June 01, 2017

SunEdison Bankruptcy Case - Something Is Seriously Wrong Here

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In their May 8 objection to the disclosure statement, the lawyers for the equity committee, Nastasi Partners, raised some key questions:
**Why did the Debtors (SunEdison)... decide to liquidate rather than reorganize?
**How did the Debtors raise $24 billion between 2013 and 2016, but manage to dissipate approximately $20 billion?
**How much are the Debtors' interests in their myriad direct and indirect subsidiaries worth - and what happened to the $9 billion the Debtors invested in them?
**Were the Debtors' servicing contracts with the YieldCo modified around the time of the bankruptcy filings to provide for unilateral termination by the YieldCos on 30 days' notice - thereby stripping the estates of significant value?
**How does the value ascribed to the Debtors' servicing business under the proposed YieldCo Settlement square with an enterprise value of $2.231 billion - the value SunEdison ascribed to that same business in January of 2016?
 Part of the problem with getting a clearer picture of the various multiple layers of subsidiaries is that even the reorganization plan is not specific about what happens with specific intercompany claims. As stated in the proposed plan: "all net Allowed Intercompany Claims (taking into account any setoffs of Intercompany Claims) held by the Debtors between and among any Affiliate of the Debtors shall be either reinstated, cancelled, released, or otherwise settled in the Debtors' discretion with the reasonable consent of the Supporting Second Lien Parties".

Many of the projects have financing that is specific to that project without guarantor of other SunEdison entities and are not part of the Chapter 11 filing. Additional entities, however, have been added over the last year to those included in the joint bankruptcy case. It is unclear on the value of these intercompany receivables and the allowance for doubtful accounts. This makes it nearly impossible to get a handle on valuation of each separate entity and a collective valuation.
After over a year in bankruptcy and over $100 million in bankruptcy fees, this case is still not finished. What happened to the $20 billion is a legitimate question. Given the enormity of the difference in the reported balance sheet for SunEdison and the very modest $84.2 cash recovery from liquidating assets, there needs to be more transparency, with a basic reconciliation statement included in the disclosure statement.

Tuesday, May 16, 2017

TerraForm Power, TerraForm Global receive Nasdaq letters

TerraForm Power (NASDAQ:TERP) and TerraForm Global (NASDAQ:GLBL) say they received notification letters from Nasdaq, saying the failure to file their latest 10-Q statements could serve as an additional basis for delisting (III).
Nasdaq previously granted the companies extensions until June 30 to regain compliance with continued listing requirements regarding their 2016 Form 10-K and Q1 2017 10-Q statements.  Source

Tuesday, April 18, 2017

Superior court justice upholds $13.6M verdict against wind power firms

Maine Superior Court Justice Michaela Murphy on Friday denied motions filed by First Wind Holdings LLC and its four subsidiaries in response to last fall's $13.6 million verdict in favor of the Eastern Maine Electric Cooperative.
In a news release announcing the decision, the cooperative's lead trial lawyer, Sigmund Schutz of the Preti Flaherty LLP law firm, said Murphy "upheld the jury's verdict that the defendants [First Wind] had acted in bad faith."
Friday's ruling upholds the November 2016 verdict by a Bangor jury awarding $13.6 million to the cooperative, after finding that First Wind and four of its former subsidiaries breached their contractual obligation to negotiate in good faith a 2011 contract to sell a 12.54-mile section of an electricity transmission line to the cooperative.
According to Preti Flaherty, the cooperative filed a lawsuit in Penobscot Superior Court in October 2014 after First Wind and its subsidiaries refused to sell the transmission line and pay for costs that had been outlined in the 2011 sales contract.
The lawsuit subsequently moved to the U.S. District Court in Bangor and then was transferred to the Maine Business and Consumer Court.
Last November's unanimous verdict against the defendants, First Wind Holdings LLC, which is now owned by SunEdison, and the four former subsidiaries, which are now owned by TerraForm Power Inc. (NASDAQ: TERP), was reached last fall after about two hours of deliberations, according to Preti Flaherty's news release.
The $13.6 million jury verdict was one of the largest ever awarded in Maine, according to the law firm.
In upholding the verdict, Preti Flaherty stated that Murphy concluded "the jury could also reasonably find that Eastern Maine Electric Cooperative" had proven its damages to a reasonable certainty … The jury's award was not excessive."
"We are extremely pleased with this decision by the Superior Court," Eastern Maine Electric Cooperative CEO Scott Hallowell said in a statement following the court's ruling. "The jury got it right. We will vigorously defend the jury's verdict in any appeal."
Eastern Maine Electric Cooperative is a consumer-owned electric utility headquartered in Calais serving 12,500 consumers in portions of Washington, Penobscot and Aroostook counties.
Defendants have 21 days to file an appeal to the Maine Supreme Judicial Court.

Read the entire article

Thursday, February 02, 2017

SunEdison Shareholder Uncovers Billions Of Dollars In Taxpayer Money Hidden In Bankruptcy

Conclusion and Consequences

SunEdison has received billions of dollars in tax incentives, loans and loan guarantees from the U.S. government. The valuation of projects and subsidiaries has been critical when obtaining these loan. If Homer Parkhill's claim that there is almost no value to the assets in SunEdison is true, it must indicate that the money granted by the U.S. government has been misplaced or mishandled.

There are several factors that point to an Enron-type scenario, and it is a surprise that neither the U.S. Department of Justice nor the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission have reacted to the situation. But at least the congressional investigations have indicated that some have started to wonder about what has happened and what is currently happening with the taxpayer money that SunEdison has already received.

It is in everyone's interest to get SunEdison's response to congress listed as a docket in this Chapter 11 case or as an SEC filling. In response to the collapse of Enron, Worldcom, and other corporations, the U.S. Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. SunEdison has decided not to file the K-10 and Q-10 pre-petition, which is actually mandatory. Therefore, SunEdison has been successful in bypassing Sarbanes-Oxley regulation that should be a tool used to avoid a new Enron scandal.


Sunday, January 15, 2017

Wind farms killing more bats than expected

Saturday, January 14, 2017

New York Liberals Refuse To Build Wind Turbines In Their Backyards

Cornell University has again delayed plans to build wind turbines, citing local concerns about health effects, noise and the proximity of homes.
Tompkins County residents fought the Black Oaks Wind Farm for the last 11 years. Ithaca is the county seat and home of the Ivy League school , which has ironically contracted to buy power from the proposed wind farm.
The wind farm is relatively small — only 16 megawatts — but it is still being opposed by many locals, despite 68 percent of the county’s residents voting for Democratic presidential nominee Hillary Clinton in the 2016 elections, according to The New York Times. Clinton promised to produce enough renewable energy to power every U.S. home, and wind would have been part of that plan.
“There’s far too much resistance across New York State, from the very same people who said ‘no shale gas [fracking] in my backyard’ are now saying no solar panels and no wind in my backyard,” Tony Ingraffea, a Cornell University researcher, said at a press conference. “You can’t have it both ways. Suck it up and be courageous.”
Read the entire article

Wednesday, December 14, 2016

SunEdison Shareholders Made Stunning Accusations In Court

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In addition, a number of shareholders have inundated the court's inbox with letters and emails (60 as of this writing) in a mad attempt to reopen the case for an Equity Committee.
The letters from shareholders vary in purpose and quality, but among their requests are: calls to prosecute Paul Gaynor (former First Wind CEO), Larry Summers (Chief of National Economic Council), Rahm Emanual (former White House Chief of Staff), Steve Scharzman (CEO of Blackstone), and John Podesta (Lobbyist for Renewable Energy) of wide spread collusion, corruption, and fraud; as well as several pleas to reverse the Official Equity Committee denial.
What is clear is that starting in late 2014 there appears to be a change in strategy. Prior to this point (highlighted in green), the Terraforms' debt is increasing incrementally with their assets received from SunEdison, and the transaction is pretty clear in both the buyer and sellers' books. However, at the start of 2015 SunEdison's balance begins to turn exponentially worse. Their assets decrease substantially as they drop them down into the yieldcos but their debt does not keep pace. Instead, debt grows substantially while the Terraform Power and Terraform Global's debt remains relatively flat. This change becomes most pronounced late 2015/early 2016. Terraform Power's assets grew by $2.7 billion, while their debt only increased $800 million. The deltas are somewhat hidden in the consolidated reporting because the overall balance sheet looks healthy as shown below:
It would appear that SunEdison was dropping assets into their yieldcos while keeping all of the debt on its books. This is what is sparking the theories and accusations of fraud. Because this action, if true, makes the entire bankruptcy appear planned from the beginning to strip the debt from the assets.
Jordan Danelz s letter claims this was possible because SunEdison was buying whole entities (such as First Wind and attempted Vivint Solar (NYSE: VSLR) for high premiums, and then keeping the shell of the entity as a subsidiary (with all of the associated debt) while dropping the assets. This was something that I discovered as unusual several months ago. At the time, I noticed SunEdison's First Wind subsidiary was not creating any revenue, despite SunEdison paying close to $2 billion for it.
This is a critical juncture between the Secured and Unsecured Creditors. Both sides are fighting over which path is best for the estate. In the meantime, Judge Bernstein demanded that SunEdison address the recent shareholders' letters. Perhaps re-evaluating the need for an Equity Committee, he asked if SunEdison had indeed gotten "rich" during the bankruptcy process. As it stands, shareholders are without representation and they have made it clear that their voice will be heard through constant letters to the court.

Wednesday, December 07, 2016

TerraForm Power, Inc. (TERP) - FORM 8-K - Dec 7 2016

Item 2.02 Results of Operations and Financial Condition.

On December 6, 2016, TerraForm Power, Inc. (“TerraForm Power”) issued a press release announcing the reporting of its financial results, and the filing of its Form 10-Q, for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2016. The press release also reported certain financial and operating metrics of TerraForm Power as of or for the fiscal quarter ended March 31, 2016 and 2015. A copy of the press release is furnished with this Current Report on Form 8-K as Exhibit 99.1.

In the attached press release, TerraForm Power discloses items not prepared in accordance with accounting principles generally accepted in the United States (“GAAP”), or non-GAAP financial measures (as defined in Regulation G promulgated by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission). A reconciliation of these non-GAAP financial measures to the most directly comparable GAAP financial measures is contained in the attached press release.

The information in this Current Report on Form 8-K (including the exhibit attached hereto) shall not be deemed “filed” for the purposes of Section 18 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (the “Exchange Act”), or otherwise subject to the liabilities of that Section. The information in this Current Report on Form 8-K (including the exhibit attached hereto) shall not be incorporated by reference into any filing or other document under the Securities Act of 1933, as amended, or the Exchange Act, except as shall be expressly set forth by specific reference in such filing or document.

Cautionary Note Regarding Forward-Looking Statements . Except for historical information contained in this Form 8-K and the press release attached as an exhibit hereto, this Form 8-K and the press release contain forward-looking statements which involve certain risks and uncertainties that could cause actual results to differ materially from those expressed or implied by these statements. Please refer to the cautionary note in the press release regarding these forward-looking statements.

Tuesday, December 06, 2016

TerraForm Power, Inc. (TERP)FORM 10-Q | Quarterly Report December 6, 2016

Claim relating to First Wind Acquisition

On May 27, 2016, D.E. Shaw Composite Holdings, L.L.C. and Madison Dearborn Capital Partners IV, L.P., as the representatives of the sellers (the “First Wind Sellers”) filed an amended complaint for declaratory judgment against the Company and Terra LLC in the Supreme Court of the State of New York alleging breach of contract with respect to the Purchase and Sale Agreement, dated as of November 17, 2014 (the “FW Purchase Agreement”) between, among others, SunEdison, the Company and Terra LLC and the First Wind Sellers. The amended complaint alleges that Terra LLC and SunEdison became jointly obligated to make $231.0 million in earn-out payments in respect of certain development assets SunEdison acquired from the First Wind Sellers under the FW Purchase Agreement, when those payments were purportedly accelerated by SunEdison's bankruptcy and by the resignations of two SunEdison employees. The amended complaint further alleges that the Company, as guarantor of certain Terra LLC obligations under the FW Purchase Agreement, is liable for this sum. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended complaint on July 5, 2016, on the ground that, among other things, SunEdison is a necessary party to this action. Plaintiffs filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss on August 22, 2016. Defendants filed their reply on September 12, 2016. A hearing on the motion to dismiss is currently scheduled to take place on January 24, 2017.

Monday, December 05, 2016

Terraform Power reports $208M net loss for 2015

TerraForm Power (TERP +1.9%) reported a $208M net loss for 2015 in its first financial report in more than a year, with a loss attributed to common shareholders of $80M, or $1.25/share, as it seeks to break away from bankrupt parent SunEdison.
TERP said in its 10-K filing that it has had trouble accessing debt and equity markets since SunEdison filed for bankruptcy in April, and that it still relies on SunEdison for operational, systems and staffing support, among other things; TERP said the bankruptcy also led to the loss of $11.3M in cancellations for residential solar projects.
TERP said it "has a well-defined process and timeline and has asked bidders to provide firm pricing by a defined date in early January 2017, with binding bids due shortly thereafter."

TerraForm Power, Inc. - Selected Financial Data

Our consolidated financial statements were prepared assuming we would continue as a going concern (which contemplates the realization of assets and the satisfaction of liabilities in the normal course of business). Our ability to continue as a going concern is dependent on many factors, including among other things, the resolution of the SunEdison Bankruptcy absent claims from interested parties that the assets and liabilities of the Company be substantively consolidated with SunEdison and that the Company and/or its assets and liabilities be included in the SunEdison Bankruptcy as well as our ability to comply with or modify our existing debt covenant requirements. Management’s plans with respect to these conditions are further described in Note 1 to our consolidated financial statements included in this annual report on Form 10-K. The following Selected Financial Data taken from our accompanying financial statements have been prepared assuming that we will continue as a going concern. These financial statements do not include any adjustments that might result from the outcome of this uncertainty.

Read the entire statement on the above link

TerraForm Power, Inc. (TERP)FORM 10-K | Annual Report

Management’s Report on Internal Control over Financial Reporting

Our management is responsible for establishing and maintaining adequate internal control over financial reporting as defined in Rules 13a-15(f) and 15d-15(f) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Our internal control over financial reporting is designed to provide reasonable assurance regarding the reliability of financial reporting and the preparation of financial statements for external purposes in accordance with U.S. generally accepted accounting principles and includes those policies and procedures that (1) pertain to the maintenance of records that, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the Company; (2) provide reasonable assurance that transactions are recorded as necessary to permit preparation of financial statements in accordance with generally accepted accounting principles, and that receipts and expenditures of the Company are being made only in accordance with authorizations of management and directors of the Company; and (3) provide reasonable assurance regarding prevention or timely detection of unauthorized acquisition, use, or disposition of the Company’s assets that could have a material effect on the financial statements.

As of December 31, 2015 , management conducted an assessment of the effectiveness of our internal control over financial reporting based upon the framework issued by the Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission in Internal Control-Integrated Framework (2013) (COSO 2013 Framework). Based on management’s assessment using these criteria, our management concluded that, as of December 31, 2015 , our internal control over financial reporting was not effective as further described below.

A material weakness is a deficiency or a combination of deficiencies in internal control over financial reporting, such that there is a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement in our annual or interim financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis. As of December 31, 2015 , we identified the following material weaknesses:

The Company, and SunEdison as our service provider for all matters related to financial reporting processes and controls, did not maintain an effective control environment, risk assessment process, information and communication process and monitoring activities based on the following:

The Company did not have effective Board oversight and management monitoring activities over the information technology system development and implementation of financial reporting processes and internal controls established by the parent company service provider;

The Company did not have a sufficient number of trained resources with assigned responsibility and accountability for financial reporting processes and the design and effective operation of internal controls conducted by the parent company service provider;

The Company did not have an effective risk assessment process that identified and assessed necessary changes in generally accepted accounting principles, financial reporting processes and internal controls, in response to risks of fraud and error impacted by changes in the business model resulting from rapid growth from acquisitions, changes in information systems, changes at SunEdison, and transition of key personnel;

The Company did not have effective information and communication processes that ensured appropriate and accurate information was available to financial reporting personnel on a timely basis in order that they could fulfill their roles and responsibilities; and

The Company did not have effective monitoring activities in place to assess whether the components of internal control were present and functioning.

Accordingly, the Company, and SunEdison as our service provider for all matters related to financial reporting processes and controls, did not have effective control activities over the following:

The Company did not have effective general information technology controls (GITCs), specifically, system development, program change, and access GITCs over the consolidation and Solar segment operating systems, databases, and IT applications. Also, the Company did not have effective access controls over the Wind Segment operating system,

databases, and IT applications. Accordingly, process level automated controls and compensating manual controls that were dependent upon the information derived from IT systems were also deemed ineffective.

The Company did not have effective controls over the completeness, existence, and accuracy of revenues, specifically, process level controls over the price and quantity inputs to revenue and accounts receivable transactions were not adequately designed and performed.

The Company did not have effective operation of reconciliation controls over the completeness, existence and accuracy of various balance sheet accounts. Specifically, the reconciliation controls did not adequately investigate, resolve and correct reconciling items on a timely basis.

The Company did not have effective controls over the completeness, existence and accuracy of allocated general and administrative expenses including payroll and other costs shared with SunEdison.

The Company did not have effective controls over the completeness, existence and accuracy of the transfer of historical costs related to renewable energy facilities acquired from SunEdison.

The Company did not have effective controls over the completeness and presentation of restricted cash. Specifically, the Company’s policies and procedures to record restricted cash were not applied consistently across accounts.

The Company did not have effective controls over the completeness and accuracy of information used in goodwill impairment, business combinations, hypothetical liquidation of book value, debt covenant compliance and going concern processes.

These control deficiencies resulted in several material misstatements to the preliminary consolidated financial statements that were corrected prior to the issuance of the audited consolidated financial statements. These control deficiencies create a reasonable possibility that a material misstatement to the consolidated financial statements will not be prevented or detected on a timely basis, and therefore we concluded that the deficiencies represent material weaknesses in the Company’s internal control over financial reporting and our internal control over financial reporting was not effective as of December 31, 2015.

Monday, April 25, 2016


SunEdison Bankruptcy for Dummbies. Share this video with the ill-informed.

Thursday, April 21, 2016

SunEdison Won't Go Bankrupt... And David Einhorn Might Have Proved My Point


Citing Rule 10b5-1 and 10b5-2, Einhorn and Greenlight would be prohibited to sell with knowledge of material, non-disclosed information.
SunEdison in late-stage negotiations to sell 450-MW to Hinduja Group.
The near-term cash flow is the driver to get a deal done and emerge strategically forward.
Although battered, I am not yet convinced that a SunEdison (NYSE:SUNE) bankruptcy is in the near-term future for shareholders. In my last article, I proposed that the company would embark on a plan to sell some assets, change management and emerge badly bruised, but not dead. This week, nothing has changed that would cause me to change my thesis.
In fact, a couple of new reports and reliable deal speculation has worked to bolster my case and has provided the first step in the right direction.
First, it's now widely reported that a "company" is in direct talks with Hinduja Group, a company based in India, to sell a 450-MW power plant. The "company" in question is U.S.-based - however, no actual name was provided. But The Hindu Business Line, which published an exclusive to the story, directed investors to the likelihood that SunEdison would be the seller of the assets. If this is indeed the case, it sets in motion the plan I outlined earlier - that with just a little bit of wiggle room, SunEdison could get enough footing to gain the traction necessary to see itself through the second half of 2016, which is the period that management has projected to realize a dramatic increase in cash flow, the kind of cash flow necessary and able to start the turnaround story. The company just needs to get there.
As was pointed out in a prior Seeking Alpha article, the projections offered by company management on April 3rd and April 11th call for 2H2016 free cash flow of over $800 million - a projection based on the completion of three solar projects, which are between 57% and 93% complete, according to a SunEdison filing. Now, whether or not investors can hold value to what management tells investors is a choice made, and to each his own, but I believe management is telling investors quite clearly that if an immediate cash injection is received to clear this current challenge, the company can emerge quickly and regain its strong position as a leader in the solar world.
I am not suggesting an immediate growth plan for SunEdison, at least not yet. But utilizing the yieldco concept does have its merit, if managed properly. What happened to the company is a result of the easy money Wall Street bubbles that seem to emerge every other year or so. With a bond market that has been offering historically low interest rates, investors had to once again look to creative ways of producing a return on investment, with a decent level of security and an expectation of a regular and predictable dividend. And institutional funds certainly flocked to the yieldco model offered by SunEdison. In fact, for the filing period ending on 12/31/16, there were 453 institutional holders representing over 266 million shares. Except for the Greenlight sale reported on 4/17/16, we have no way of knowing who is still holding positions into the end of the second quarter.
It remains part of my contention that the market forces will intervene and not allow billions of dollars of investment losses to be realized. Keep in mind that when we say institutional funds, we are talking about vehicles of investment for retail holders as well as for other institutional funds. Remembering the Madoff days, "funds of funds" were investing into his scheme. But SunEdison is not a scheme, and for a relatively small amount of cash, the company can emerge and generate meaningful cash flows within sixty days of future operations, based on its own model. Investors just want a deal that keeps the company alive and allows investors the long-term prospects of realizing healthy gains in the future. Dilution is not a factor.
I understand the argument that the Greenlight share sale was the final message to the market that SunEdison is headed for a bankruptcy filing. However, I see it quite differently, and it's a second reason that supports my thesis that the company is not planning an imminent bankruptcy filing.
Because Greenlight has a sitting Board member in SunEdison, namely Claire Gogel, they would be bound by the material information clause incorporated into SEC Rule 10b5-1 and 10b5-2. The definition is clear, and I don't see where there is room for Einhorn to trade around a near-term or imminent bankruptcy filing. In my opinion, it would clearly violate the Rule.
Rule 10b5-1 states that:
Rule 10b5-1 provides that a person trades on the basis of material nonpublic information if a trader is "aware" of the material nonpublic information when making the purchase or sale. The rule also sets forth several affirmative defenses or exceptions to liability. The rule permits persons to trade in certain specified circumstances where it is clear that the information they are aware of is not a factor in the decision to trade, such as pursuant to a pre-existing plan, contract, or instruction that was made in good faith.
Rule 10b5-2 states that:
Rule 10b5-2 clarifies how the misappropriation theory applies to certain non-business relationships. This rule provides that a person receiving confidential information under circumstances specified in the rule would owe a duty of trust or confidence and thus could be liable under the misappropriation theory.
I further checked to make sure that a filing of a Form 4 or 13d was a defense to trading on material, non-public information, and I was unable to find a plausible defense that would allow such a trade to happen. It would be entirely unreasonable to believe that Einhorn would not have knowledge of a decision made by the Board and management to proceed towards a bankruptcy filing. In fact, with as many leashes that Greenlight put around SUNE management's neck, the idea that Einhorn would not have knowledge to a pending material event would be a stretch of conventional reality.
The trading action on the stock also indicates that investors are undecided as to what will happen with SunEdison. After the initial sell-off attributed to Einhorn cutting his stake, the shares rebounded sharply on Wednesday, trading higher by 28% before a modest pullback into the close. In my opinion, other investors could be theorizing that if Einhorn sold shares, a bankruptcy filing might not be a decided reality.
I have spent considerable time trying to find an "out" for his decision to sell, and with my assumption that he would have knowledge of boardroom activity, I can't find one. The rule is clear and there are no exceptions. Certain regulatory filings are required, and he made them. But that does not release him from stringent regulations regarding buying or selling shares while in possession of material and non-publicly disseminated information.
For these reasons, my thesis remains. SunEdison is too big to fail on many levels. From the "messy" court proceedings to the billions in losses to private and public equity funds, the damage would be too far-reaching to not have a lifeline thrown the company's way. Further, the recent trading activity does not indicate an imminent bankruptcy. Yes, the stock is beaten down to .34 cents; however, millions of shares are still changing hands on a daily basis, leading me to believe that I am far from being alone with my prophetic thoughts of glory days ahead.
Love SUNE or hate SUNE, it's a 50/50 debate at this point in time. But one thing is for sure. Regardless of the pounding on the table by some media outlets about the company's future, no one outside of the Board room knows for sure what SunEdison plans to do in the immediate future.
In my opinion, SUNE management views the second half of the year as its entry into the promised land and will do everything possible, including asset sales, to deliver the company to serenity. And it can't happen fast enough - we all need some "serenity now".

Wednesday, April 20, 2016

Pelosi’s Husband Invested in Solar Firm Weeks Before Lucrative Expansion

SunEdison is now eyeing bankruptcy, but Paul Pelosi invested right before a 2014 stock rally

House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi’s husband bought up to a quarter million dollars of stock in a now financially troubled green energy company just weeks before it announced a major 2014 acquisition that sent stock prices soaring, public records show.
SunEdison told regulators last week that it is eyeing bankruptcy under the weight of $11.7 million in debt. But in late 2014, investors were bullish on the company, which manufactures and operates solar and wind power facilities.
Its 2014 purchase of wind energy company First Wind “further bolstered the reputation of the company,” wrote one market-watcher at the time. “Perhaps unsurprisingly, SunEdison’s stock soared an astounding 29% on news of this acquisition alone.”
Pelosi’s husband, Paul Pelosi, had invested just in time. He bought between $100,000 and $250,000 in SunEdison stock on Oct. 24, 2014, according to congressional financial disclosures. The company announced its First Wind acquisition on Nov. 17.
Pelosi’s office did not respond to questions about the timing of the purchase and whether she or her husband had any advance knowledge of the deal.
Pelosi has previously been accused of trading stock based on information gleaned through her official duties. She participated in Visa’s initial public offering as the company fought a House bill to subject credit card companies to increased regulation. The measure failed to pass.
A law passed in the wake of that controversy prohibits members of Congress from using nonpublic information for personal gain. Language in that measure was informally dubbed the “Pelosi Provision.”
In addition to her stock trades, Pelosi steered more than $1 billion in federal subsidies to a light rail project that likely improved the value of the San Francisco headquarters of cloud computing company Salesforce, in which her husband had invested up to $1 million.
Paul Pelosi’s stake in SunEdison will likely force the wealthy investor to take a haircut if the company declares bankruptcy. SunEdison’s First Wind acquisition turned out to be a significant part of a larger expansion over the last two years that left the company with unsustainable levels of debt.
On the heels of its First Wind deal, in July 2015, SunEdison announced that it would buy residential power company Vivint Solar for $2.2 billion. Its stock improved on the news, and then began its precipitous decline.
The Vivint deal fell apart in March. The company accused SunEdison of breach of contract, and SunEdison announced that it had been subpoenaed by the Department of Justice over the failed acquisition.
SunEdison has maintained strong a strong presence in Washington throughout its financial woes. The company has spent more than $1 million on its lobbying operation since 2011.
It has employed lobbyists with the powerhouse Podesta Group since 2012, disclosure forms show. In 2015, it brought on 38 North Solutions, a green energy focused lobbying firm. Both firms lobbied to preserve federal tax credits for renewable energy generation.
Pelosi fought for the extension of those tax subsidies in a major congressional deal late last year.
The Podesta Group is run by a top Hillary Clinton fundraiser. Its cofounder chairs her presidential campaign, to which SunEdison donated last year. The company has also donated to the Bill, Hillary, and Chelsea Clinton Foundation.
The son of Ira Magaziner, the chief executive of the foundation’s health policy arm, served as a “clean energy associate” at the foundation before taking a project finance position at SunEdison last year.

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First Wind Holdings Inc. IPO public offering

TEN Reasons
Why the SEC should not allow First Wind to be listed on NASDAQ

First Wind Holdings Inc. 12/22/09 SEC S1/A IPO Filing

First Wind Holdings Inc. 7/31/08 SEC S1 IPO Filing

May 14, 2010 addition to the First Wind Holdings Inc. SEC S1A IPO Filing

August 18, 2010 amendment 7 to the First Wind Holdings Inc. SEC S1A IPO Filing

October 13, 2010 Filing update to the First Wind Holdings Inc. SEC S1A IPO Filing

New October 25, 2010 Filing update to the First Wind Holdings Inc. SEC S1A IPO Filing

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